The USS Liberty

On June 8, 1967, during the Six Day War, several waves of Israeli war planes, probably unmarked, followed by 3 torpedo boats, and then one or more helicopters filled with commandos, attacked the USS Liberty. killing 34 sailors and wounding another 171 (a 70% casualty rate).  The USS Liberty was a plainly marked noncombatant vessel, performing legal surveillance, in international waters.

“If the American people understood what a grip (the Israelis) have got on our government, they would rise up in arms. Our citizens certainly don’t have any idea what goes on.”

Thomas H Moorer, longest actively serving four star admiral in US history, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and NATO commander, Aug 24, 1983 interview.

The attack on the USS Liberty is “the most convincing example of Israel’s power over the US.“

Ray McGovern, CIA analyst from 1963 to 1990, who chaired the National Intelligence Estimates and prepared the President’s Daily Briefings in the 1980’s. Iran War and the USS Liberty, Sept 8, 2008 at 5:49. (emphasis ours)

“Israel’s leaders concluded that nothing they might do would offend the Americans to the point of reprisal. If American leaders did not have the courage to punish Israel for the blatant murder of American citizens, it seemed clear that their American friends would let them get away with almost anything.”

Undersecretary of State  and UN Ambassador George Ball, The Passionate Attachment: America’s Involvement with Israel, pages 57-58.

See Ball’s quote, in the final note of this USS LIberty page.

The New York Times limited coverage of the carnage to a brief item, on page 19.

Fresh Content

For those well versed on the topic, fresh content here may include, in the order in which they appear:

1. Brief history

2. Zionists at the top in US foreign policy

3. Israeli border buildup or not, as a red herring

4. Message from Nasser possibly cooked by Israel, tricking Jordan into attacking

5. Soviet Plan to nuke Israel’s coast, if Syria attacked

6. Argument the US needed no first hand intelligence, once it knew Israel might attack Syria

7. Double standard of Mossad motto

8. List of 11 factors, consistent with a botched false flag operation by the white house

9. Law of the mosser (report a jew, rot in hell)

10. Gentiles as livestock, and Egyptian ship El Quseir

11. Talmudic chorus “El Quseir” called, and sung by all

12. Analysis of 11 am board removal, shelling, and speed estimates (Morning of June 8 below, 17th paragraph)

13. 2007 NSA release, 2007 Crewdson article, 2013 Cristol book (throughout)

14. 1980 weapons convention on napalm

15. Adm Kidd’s supplemental finding that no AA message was sent

16. Failure of Israeli Motor Torpedo Boats (MTB’s) to triangulate, due to time pressure after the SOS got through

17. Alex Jones’ hyperbole attributed to LBJ, “I want that goddamn ship on the bottom”

18. 2004 declaration of Cpt. Boston

19. Observations about Mr. Cristol

Moorer Independent Commission Report

he report read in part:

”…4. That there is compelling evidence that Israel’s attack was a deliberate attempt to destroy an American ship and kill her entire crew; evidence of such intent is supported by statements from Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Undersecretary of State George Ball, former CIA director Richard Helms, former NSA directors Lieutenant General William Odom, USA (Ret.), Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, USN (Ret.), and Marshal Carter; former NSA deputy directors Oliver Kirby and Major General John Morrison, USAF (Ret.); and former Ambassador Dwight Porter, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon in 1967;

5. That in attacking USS Liberty, Israel committed acts of murder against American servicemen and an act of war against the United States;
6. That fearing conflict with Israel, the White House deliberately prevented the U.S. Navy from coming to the defense of USS Liberty by recalling Sixth Fleet military rescue support while the ship was under attack; evidence of the recall of rescue aircraft is supported by statements of Captain Joe Tully, Commanding Officer of the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga, and Rear Admiral Lawrence Geis, the Sixth Fleet carrier division commander, at the time of the attack; never before in American naval history has a rescue mission been cancelled when an American ship was under attack;
7. That …..surviving crewmembers were later threatened with “court-martial, imprisonment or worse” if they exposed the truth; and were abandoned by their own government;
8. That due to the influence of Israel’s powerful supporters in the United States, the White House deliberately covered up the facts of this attack from the American people;
9. That due to continuing pressure by the pro-Israel lobby in the United States, this attack remains the only serious naval incident that has never been thoroughly investigated by Congress; to this day, no surviving crewmember has been permitted to officially and publicly testify about the attack;
10. That there has been an official cover-up without precedent in American naval history; the existence of such a cover-up is now supported by statements of Rear Admiral Merlin Staring, USN (Ret.), former Judge Advocate General of the Navy; and Captain Ward Boston, USN, (Ret.), the chief counsel to the Navy’s 1967 Court of Inquiry of Liberty attack;
11. That the truth about Israel’s attack and subsequent White House cover-up continues to be officially concealed from the American people to the present day and is a national disgrace;
12. That a danger to our national security exists whenever our elected officials are willing to subordinate American interests to those of any foreign nation, and specifically are unwilling to challenge Israel’s interests when they conflict with American interests; this policy, evidenced by the failure to defend USS Liberty and the subsequent official cover-up of the Israeli attack, endangers the safety of Americans and the security of the United States.”

Only 10 of the 300 leading US newspapers covered the report.

Background

Long Term.

Israel seeks to re-establish a jewish polity, similar to the one existent during part of the period between about 1300 and 500 BCE. Jewish Virtual Library, myths and facts. It was claimed as the rightful eretz homeland by modern israel’s founders, in 1948. Statement of Col. Ralph R. Hoppe, chief of the middle east intelligence section of J2, Tampa, May of 1991, para. 4, show-the-house.com. The eretz ran at times from the Nile into Iraq, including Syria, Jordan, and other areas. Chosenpeople.com. To a considerable extent, the stealth, genocide and territorial seizure at Jericho set the tone of Torah, known to Christians as the first five books of the old testament, a history which is judaism’s foundational tome.

At the end of the 1948 war of independence, the only parts of the former British mandate in the north, not held by Israel, were those held by Syria, along the Jordan. Israel insisted on keeping the areas it held, that had been designated as part of the new Palestinian state,while insisting the Syria relinquish the areas of the former mandate controlled by Syria. Syria agreed that the areas Syria controlled could be a DMZ, pending final resolution. Wikipedia, Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission, background.

Since 1948, Israel schooled its children, with maps of the historical and biblical Israel, as addressed by Arthur Lilienthal in his website, before he died in 2008. (The educational approach of both sides was addressed in a 2013 study.)

Syria fortified the western crest of the heights. Britannica, Golan Heights. Beginning in 1948, they installed bunkers designed to withstand 500 and 1,000 lb bombs, with lips to resist napalm–row on row of emplacements with tank traps, anti-aircraft guns, etc, running 10 miles deep. James Ennes, Assault on the Liberty, 1979, p. 210. Clearly, Syria’s mindset was defensive, like France in building the Maginot line.

Israel diverted the heights’ fresh water source, the Jordan River, pushed Palestinians out of the demilitarized zone just below them, settled and farmed it. Time.com, the Golan Heights. Syria responded with shellings, other military maneuvers, and building alternative water facilities in the heights, which diverted water from the DMZ and Israel below.

According to former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia James Akins, “Every one of the 1,000-odd clashes between Syria and Israel between 1948 and 1967 was examined by the UN supervisory commission, which found that only a very few had clearly been caused by the Syrians. A few dozen were ambiguous, and all the rest were caused by Israel.” Sources less aligned with arab interests say otherwise, and this point needs to be closely vetted, but with Dayan’s admissions below noted.

April 7 to June 7.

On April 7, 1967 Israel shot down 6 Syrian MIGs in a dog fight above the Golan Heights. The MIGs had been sent up to block Israeli planes targeting Syrian guns and villages, responding in turn to earlier Syrian assaults.

“Moshe Dayan, the celebrated commander who, as Defense Minister in 1967, gave the order to conquer the Golan…[said] many of the firefights with the Syrians were deliberately provoked by Israel, and the kibbutz residents who pressed the Government to take the Golan Heights did so less for security than for the farmland…[Dayan stated] ‘They didn’t even try to hide their greed for the land…We would send a tractor to plow some area where it wasn’t possible to do anything, in the demilitarized area, and knew in advance that the Syrians would start to shoot. If they didn’t shoot, we would tell the tractor to advance further, until in the end the Syrians would get annoyed and shoot. And then we would use artillery and later the air force also, and that’s how it was…” General’s Words Shed a New a Light on the Golan, The New York Times, May 11, 1997, based on comments of Dayan to a reporter in 1976.

Eyal Ziser quotes Dayan like this, in this excerpt from June 1967: Israel’s Capture of the Golan Heights,” Muse.jhu.edu, Israel Studies 7.01 (2002), 168-194

“I know how at least 80 per cent of the incidents began there . . . It would happen like this: We would send a tractor to plow someplace where nothing could be done, in the demilitarized zone, knowing ahead of time that the Syrians would start shooting. If they didn’t shoot, we would tell the tractor to go on, until the Syrians got annoyed and [began] shooting. Then we would activate the artillery and later also the airforce . . . I did this, and so did Laskov and Chera [respectively, Major Generals Haim Laskov and Tzvi Tzur, Rabin’s predecessors as Chief of Staff]. Yitzhak Rabin did it when he was there in the early sixties. But it seems to me that Dado [Lt. Gen. David Elazar, GOC Northern Command during the Six-Day War] enjoyed these games more than anyone else.”

Contrast the UN commission’s findings and Dayan’s comments with the following telegram language, from Israeli PM Eshkol to Pres Johnson on May 18, 1967:

“The primary link in the chain of tension is the Syrian policy of terrorist infiltration and sabotage. From Under Secretary Rostow’s conversation with Ambassador Harman, I am glad to learn that your government and mine are agreed on this. You are correct, Mr. President, in stating that we are having our patience tried to the limits….”

Eshkol visited the LBJ ranch in 1966.

Thus, through Zionist Eugene Rostow, the US and Israel agreed to what the UN study and Israel’s minister of defense at the time, Dayan, viewed as false. Eugene’s Zionist bent is illustrated by his later view, that Israeli settlements in the west bank are legal. He contended Israel is not bound by UN resolution 242, calling for “secure and recognized boundaries”. Eric Rozenman, Israeli Settlements Are More Than Legitimate, opinion, LA Times, Dec 11, 2009. Apologists for the settlements also point to a difference under international law, between territory taken through aggression, or self defense, and point to the Six Day War as a defensive taking. Id. No doubt, the Rostow/Johnson consensus addressed above was driven by that distinction.

Eugene’s brother Walter Rostow was Johnson’s National Security Advisor, who informed LBJ of the torpedo attack on the Liberty. Ahron Jay Cristol, the Liberty Incident Revealed, 2013, Naval Institute Press, p. 63. Walter’s teaching at MIT had been funded by the CIA beginning in 1950. Historically, the CIA and Israel’s intelligence agency , Mossad, were symbiotic. Cristol, id, p 126.

On May 12, 1967, Israeli PM Eshkol said in a speech at a closed meeting of Mapai37 leaders “In view of the fourteen incidents of sabotage and infiltration perpetrated in the past month alone, Israel may have no other choice but to adopt suitable countermeasures against the focal points of sabotage. Israel will continue to take action to prevent any and all attempts to perpetrate sabotage within her territory. There will be no immunity for any state which aids or abets such acts.” Israel made other strong statements about retaliation against Syria that spring. Cristol, id, p. 9, ftn 1.

Israel Plans to Invade Syria?

On May 13, the Soviets told Egypt that Israeli had amassed 11-13 brigades on the Syrian border, and intended to invade Syria. Israel denied any border build up, and there is still no evidence a border build up occurred. Cristol (id, p 10) and a number of commentators, especially Israel supporters, have pointed to that as proof that Soviet troublemaking was the real cause of the mutual escalation and war.

However, the question of where Israel might be building up was largely a red herring. The key was the invasion which the Soviets anticipated, and the “border buildup” was apparently injected for dramatic effect. A brief by Leonid Brezhnev, Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, “documents that throughout April-May, 1967, the Kremlin suspected that Israel was planning an act of aggression against Syria. Determined to forestall the Israeli offensive and to rescue the new radical-left regime in Damascus, the Soviet government informed Egypt that Israel had mobilized its armed forces on the border with Syria. By doing so, Moscow hoped to manipulate Nasser into assisting Syria by concentrating his armed forces on Egypt’s border with Israel. The Kremlin estimated mistakenly, as if turned out – that Israel was militarily weak and could not cope with a war on two fronts. Subsequently, Moscow consented to the ejection of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces from outposts on the Israeli-Egyptian border, and to the concentration of Egyptian troops on the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip.” Uri Bar-Noi, The Soviet Union and the Six Day War: Revelation from the Polish Archives

Jerusalem is only 65 miles from the Golan Heights, suggesting that if such a plan existed, Israel could have moved many troops  to the Heights in a very short time. They could also have dropped men and armored vehicles by air behind the heavily fortified heights quickly, which they ultimately did on June 9, as addressed below.

Israel’s UN rep, Gideon Raphael, assured the UN on May 14, in any event, there was “no reason for anyone to be concerned about military action by Israel, as long as the other side took none.” Cristol, id, p. 11.

Syria asked Egypt, leader of the Arab world, to help them block the suspected invasion, as the Soviets anticipated Syria would. Nasser immediately moved lead units of two divisions into the Sinai, and put the army on full alert. He asked UN observers to leave the Sinai on May 16, and the UN complied within 3 days. On May 22, Egypt closed the south end of the gulf of Aquaba Arab leaders made saber-rattling statements. Doron Geller, Intelligence During the Six Day War (1967), jewishvirtuallibrary.org. On May 30, Egypt and Jordan signed a 5 year aggression pact, and they signed similar pacts with Iraq and other arab states.

Based on the goal of Israel to attain expansive borders, held by jews thousands of years ago; the massive ethnic cleansing 19 years earlier; the ongoing refusal of Israel to declare its borders; the strategies followed by Israel for years toward the heights, as acknowledged by Dayan; Israel’s May 12 statement; and the Soviet report to Nasser; apparently Nasser felt it necessary to show the arab world he would stand up to Israel.

However, neither Israel nor the US saw the Arab troop maneuvers or UN withdrawal as a major threat. Egypt would need a year and a half to prepare, and Israel would defeat all three of them if necessary, in 7 to 10 days. This has been acknowledged by Begin, Rabin, Bentov, Eban and the Johnson administration, contrary to the major media spin. In 1982, Prime Minister Begin admitted, “The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.”

Mordechai Bentov, a member of Israel’s coalition cabinet during the war, said, “All this story about the danger of extermination has been a complete invention and has been blown up a posteriori to justify the annexation of new Arab territories.” Zeev Maoz, former Israeli professor of military strategy, notes, Israel waged a “war of choice”, or “deliberate Israeli aggressive design” (a terrorist operation), and fulfilled its long-time, stated goal of colonizing more legally reserved Palestinian territory, refusing through today to follow the democratic global consensus and decolonize the conquered lands.”

Gulf of Aqaba

Israel did clarify its May 14 assurance on May 19, by reiterating its ongoing view, that blocking the Straits of Tiran, at the south end of the Gulf of Aqaba, would be viewed as an act of war. That would cut off Israel’s direct access to the Indian Ocean, and 80% or more of its oil supply as obtained at the time.

As to the Gulf of Aqaba and Straits of Tiran, the UAR and its Arab allies were not signatories to the 1958 Geneva Conventions, and argued that since the Gulf of Aqaba was not a waterway connecting two regions of open sea, it was not technically a strait, and therefore not covered by the 1949 ICJ decision ruling that a country is required to allow passage through a strait. Moreover, the UAR disputed Israel’s legal right to Eilat, the port requiring access through Tiran, Because Eliat was captured after the 1949 armistice imposed by the Security Council. Wikipedia, controversies relating to the Six Day War. These issues had been addressed informally, rather than being formally resolved after the Suez crisis in 1956. Cristol, p. 12.

Moreover, Israel agreed on May 23, the day after the closing was announced, to the US proposal for safe escort, a commitment the US made after the Suez crisis in 1956. Jeremy R Hammond, “Israel’s Attack on Egypt in ’67 Was Not ‘Pre-emptive’ “, Foreign Policy Journal, July 4, 2010. Israel wanted to show nonetheless that it could keep the straits open on its own.

Foreign Minister Eban met privately with LBJ, Eugene Rostow and McNamara in Washington on May 26, asking what diplomatic support the US would give if Israel moved militarily. As they left, Rostow asked LBJ if he thought “they’ll go”, and LBJ said yes. Cristol, id, p. 13. Cristol omitted this quote from the same meeting, set out in the official US Dept of State history: “Israel.”   As of at least August, 2021, the quote now appears deleted from the US State Dept history as well, probably due to zionist domination of the department.  Johnson told Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban on May 26, “will not be alone unless it decides to go it alone.”

Britain, Canada and Holland agreed by May 28 to participate in the escort. Jay Cristol’s timeline.

On May 30, Israel said it would wait two more weeks for Aqaba to be opened. Timeline, id. Even after the 2 weeks, ie June 14, if things had not settled down, Egypt would have little chance of keeping the straits closed.

On June 3, the head of Mossad returned from Washington, and reported the US was not making any progress on the straits (in spite of the very recent joinder of Britain, Canada and Holland to the escort team). He also reported the US was resigned to Israeli military action (in spite of a meeting Dean Rusk had scheduled for June 7 to resolve the matter diplomatically, pleading with Israel not to attack. Hoppe, id, para. 5 ) Cristol, p. 15. “Though Johnson continued to caution Israel against preemption, a number of the President’s advisors had concluded that U.S. interests would be best served by Israel ‘going it alone’ by the time the Israelis actually did so. Dept of State history, id.

The Attack on Egypt

Israel attacked on June 5, destroying 80% or more of the Egyptian air force on the ground. (After the war, the UN General Assembly held an emergency session, and “not one country in the world” [apart from Israel] said Israel had acted in self defense.) Tito Howard, id.

Jordan and Syria, egged on by false assurances, purportedly from Nasser, that Egypt was kicking tush, launched modest attacks. Israel wiped out most of their air forces as well, then invaded the West Bank, Jerusalem, Gaza, and as addressed below on June 9, the Golan Heights.

I say purportedly, because Egyptian ambassador Kassem believed Israel “cooked” a message to make King Hussein of Jordan think it was from Nasser, thereby tricking Jordan into attacking. Cristol, id, p 110, unpublished Kassem manuscript.

All the arab countries except Syria signed a cease fire by June 7, the day before the attack on the USS Liberty.

Possible Motives

Three possible motives have been advanced for the attack on this US spy ship, about 25 miles northwest of Arish, Egypt, and a greater distance from Israel.

1. The Golan Heights.

See background above.

The US did not want Israel trying to take land from Syria.

According to Alan Hart, former BBC correspondent and chief middle east correspondent for Independent Television News, in Israel’s Attack on the USS Liberty–the Full Story, June 7, 2012, the Johnson administration gave Israel the green light to attack Egypt only. (This was apparently reflected in the “will they go?” dialogue of May 26). Israel could respond to intervention by Jordan or Syria, but on no account, widen the war to take their territory. Hart says Syria secretly agreed with Israel to provide only token support for Egypt, and Johnson was confident Syria would keep its word. A primary task of the Liberty was vigilance against Israel attacking Syria instead. Johnson had publicly committed to the “political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations in that area”, and also feared the Soviets would intervene, if Israel attacked both Egypt and Syria.

The concern about the Soviets was well based, because the Soviets had contingency plans to fire eight P-6 (SS-12) nuclear missiles onto Israel’s heavily populated and industrialized coast, if Israel or the US invaded Syria. Col. Peyton E Smith, Assault on the U.S.S. Liberty: Deliberate Action or Tragic Accident? U.S. Army War College, 2007, p3.

U.S. Ambassador Barbour did become aware Israel might attack Syria, but did not give approval. Cristol says that so long as the US knew about Israel’s possible invasion, the U.S. would have no need to monitor communications, but that is myopic. First hand information could be critical, both in dealing with the Soviets, and in honoring the US commitment to territorial integrity of all nations in the region.

Dayan had planned to attack the Golan Heights at 11:30 am June 8, and did not want the U.S.’s best spy ship monitoring every wireless signal and move. The Liberty reached its surveillance point at about 9am, just a few hours before. Ennes, Assault on the Liberty, id, p 211.

Also, the UN cease fire was set for June 9. Reverdy S. Fishel, “The Attack on the USS Liberty: An ‘Accident?” International Journal of intelligence and Counter-intelligence Fall, 1995. Fishel, id. As the Liberty approached, Israel pressed the U.S. as to whether it was a U.S. ship, and its mission. The State Dept kept delaying response until 24 hrs before the Liberty was attacked. This was consistent with the culture of intelligence work, as in NSA for “No Such Agency.” Lacking a response, Israel said it would be presumed hostile, and subject to attack. Hoppe, id, para. 7.

Hart reports that on the evening of June 7, apparently after learning the identity, Israel told the US defense attaché in Tel Aviv that if the Liberty continued to move closer to Israel’s coast, they would attack it— in international waters or not, and the attaché forwarded the message to Washington. (Why didn’t Israel or the attaché copy the Liberty directly, by wireless?) Later that evening, around 10 pm, Israeli jets circled the Liberty, with their fire control radar directed at it. The Liberty crew had not gotten the earlier message, and thought it was a joke, by a known ally. Hart, id. (Washington sent out instructions three times over several hours, high priority, for the Liberty to move 100 miles away, but those instructions reportedly did not get through. Also, why didn’t the Israeli jets and Liberty communicate directly?)

Did the Liberty have a right to spy on Israel from international waters?

Cristol acknowledges it did, even if it was a warship, so long as not acting as an agent of another combatant. Cristol, id, p. 24. It would nonetheless be “in harm’s way.” Id. (The Liberty was a US Navy ship, as reflected by the “USS”.)  However, as reflected by the GTR on the hull, standing for Auxilliary Technical Research, it was a noncombatant auxiliary ship. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technical_research_ship). This was confirmed by the near total lack of weaponry and the 45 antennas and discs (Cristol, id, p 24).

Was it there to spy on Israel?

The lack of designated Hebrew translators suggests not. Fischel, id. However, Chief engineer George Golden says there were two undesignated persons who spoke some Hebrew. Bryant Jordan, Liberty Incident Author Jay Cristol Still Will Not Let Survivors Tell Their Story, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, June/July 2014, pp 20-21.). Also, receptions could have been forwarded to the NSA for translation, as the EC-121 recon planes did. New Revelations in Attack on American Spy Ship, John Crewdson, Chicago Tribune, October 2, 2007. Crewdson had won a Pulitzer Prize for national reporting, and a nomination for explanatory reporting. His 2007 story followed release of some NSA records, hidden for 40 years until June 8, 2007. After Israel’s June 5 sneak attack, the U.S. stepped up its surveillance of them. Hoppe, id, para 6. Lt Cdr Lewis told his spooks to take down anything they could get. War College, id, ftn 73.

Mossad’s motto, “By Way of Deception, Thou Shalt Do War” points to a remarkable double standard, in objecting to perfectly legal surreptitious intelligence gathering by the U.S., and attacking the ship undertaking it.

Washington also apparently did not warn Israel, not to attack this American vessel. This oversight was especially ill-advised, if an anecdote from a book signing by Body of Secrets author James Bamford is accurate. In the early days of U.S. peacekeeping forces in the Sinai, the American deputy chief of mission in Tel Aviv got an urgent call from a furious then-Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, complaining that an American U-2 had drifted three kilometers into Israeli territory. “If one of them drifts over again,” Dayan yelled at his American “ally,” “we’ll shoot it down.”History Channel’s “Cover Up:Attack on the USS Liberty” gives crew chance to tell their story, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 2001 October. (Dayan might have had a legal right to shoot at the U-2, but not attack the Liberty.) Cristol calls the history channel program a “hatchet job,” listing what he views as errors or oversights, some more serious than others. Cristol, id, p 188.

The Attack on Syria

Dayan later acknowledged “The Syrians, on the fourth day of the war, were not a threat to us.” Dayan, id. Nonetheless, on June 9 (after the June 8 attack on the Liberty, and six hours after the UN imposed cease fire commenced), Israel dropped troops and armored vehicles behind the heavily fortified heights, killing 2,500 Syrian soldiers trapped in the middle, and wounding 5,000 others, with 115 Israelis killed, and 306 wounded. Basically, Israel did what the Soviets warned Syria on May 13 that Israel was going to do anyway. They expelled or drove out (fleeing the combat) 80,000 to 100,000 druse and other indigenous people, leaving about 7,000, and in 1981, annexed the two thirds of the heights originally seized, about 500 square miles. The UN Security Council does not recognize the annexation. Wikipedia, Golan Heights.

2. Exposing War Crimes in the Sinai.

The second possible motive was fear of exposing Israeli war crimes in the Sinai. Israel generally denied such crimes occurred, and kept their interviews with Israeli soldiers at the time under wraps.  However, the coverup was eventually exposed in a number of news articles.  See Israel Reportedly Killed POWs in ’67 War: Historians Say Deaths of Hundreds of Egyptians Was Covered Up in The Washington Post Aug 17, 1995.

“Military historian Aryeh Yitzhaki said today that Israeli troops carried out several mass killings in 1967 in which about 1,000 Egyptian prisoners were slain in the Sinai. Yitzhaki, who worked in the army’s history department after the war, said he and other officers collected testimony from dozens of solders who admitted killing POWs. He said a report on the killings submitted to his superiors has been locked in a safe at military headquarters.”

Another Israeli historian, Uri Milstein, said there were many incidents in the 1967 war in which Egyptian soldiers were killed by Israeli troops after they had raised their hands in surrender.

‘It was not an official policy, but there was an atmosphere that it was okay to do it,” Milstein said. “Some commanders decided to do it; others refused. But everyone knew about it.”

A Sept 25, 1995 CNN.com byline, Mass Grave may strain Israeli-Egyptian relations, reads in part “El Arish. Villager Hassan Al-Malah declares to other searchers he’s found more bones. Neighbors quickly dig up what they say is a mass grave of Egyptian prisoners killed by Israeli soldiers during the 1967 war.

The Bedouins say they witnessed hundreds of Egyptian soldiers executed without trial. Then they buried the bodies when Israelis left them to rot in the desert sun. ‘They would nail the prisoners hands to the trees like this and shoot them,’ said witness Hassan Al-Malah, raising his hands behind his head.”

Also, a New York Times article of January 25, 1915, Disillusioned by War, Israeli Soldiers Muted in 1967 Are Given Fuller Voice reads in part:

TEL AVIV — A young Israeli soldier, fresh from the front, bluntly recounts the orders from above. “They never said, ‘Leave no one alive,’ but they said, ‘Show no mercy,’ ” he explains. “The brigade commander said to kill as many as possible.”

Another recalls encountering Arabs on rooftops. “They’re civilians — should I kill them or not?” he asks himself. “I didn’t even think about it. Just kill! Kill everyone you see.” And a third makes it personal: “All of us — Avinoam, Zvika, Yitzhaki — we’re not murderers. In the war, we all became murderers.”

These quotes were from a film by a young Israeli, Censored Voices. The review in Haeretz, Feb 2, 2015 read in part:

“The veterans also graphically describe multiple instances of Israeli soldiers — including themselves — shooting unarmed soldiers and civilians. ‘Several times we captured guys, positioned them and just killed them,’ one veteran recalls.”

https://youtu.be/Eh0Z1VfYPcE

 

3. Operation Cyanide.

This third possible motive was a top secret flexible strategy, including an option to attack Cairo, take out Nasser, and possibly seize the Suez canal, in response to an “Egyptian” sinking of the Liberty, not unlike Gulf of Tonkin, or speculatively, the USS Maine. Operation Northwoods mapped out possible scenarios in the early 1960’s.

One of the key players in Cyanide was James Angleton, per the BBC documentary USS Liberty: Dead in the Water, 2002, at 45:57 to 50:07. A long time CIA-Mossad link, Angleton was sometimes called “the Mossad Mole”, and his name comes up a lot in discussion of the JFK assassination.

This documentary was by Peter Hounan, chief investigative journalist for the Sunday Times of London from 1986 to 1994, who won the prestigious Scoup of the Year Award in 1996. The 303 Committee’s job was to meet in the Executive Office Building, and review covert operations. It reviewed Operation Cyanide, called Frontlet 615, in April of 1967. Operation Cyanide: How the Bombing of the USS Liberty nearly caused WW III (Vision, 2003) also by Hounam.

Hounan’s book provides no smoking gun, but note the following:

1. Unarmed warship placed in harms way, with a destroyer escort denied.
2. Extraordinary series of “errors” over more than a day, in conveying five top priority messages, intended to get the ship out of harm’s way– in a system that normally sent a copy of each first transmission to the ultimate recipient, and in which each transmission normally took from 5 to 70 minutes. Cristol, p. 21-22.
3. Direct naval liasson for Israel denied (instead requiring Israel to go through the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv, who had a direct radio contact with the 6th Fleet. Former Israeli Ambassador to the US Michael B Oren Unfriendly fire, New Republic, July 23, 2001, and US Army War College Pamphlet, ftn 26.)
4. No warning to Israel not to attack as threatened.
5. White house recall of rescue fighters, launched during the attack to meet forces, still unknown by the Liberty.
6. Apparent nuclear warhead drill aboard the carrier U.S.S. America, at the time of the Liberty attack, addressed below.
7. Message by U.S. authorities to US Embassy in Cairo, that the city might be bombed. There was “an oral history report from the American Embassy in Cairo, now in the LBJ Library, which notes that the Embassy received an urgent message from Washington warning that Cairo was about to be bombed by US forces, presumably in mistaken retaliation for the USS Liberty attack. That strange message was never explained or cancelled.” James Ennis, Assault on the Liberty, Random House, 1979 , addendum to 2007 edition.
8. Massive across the board cover-up, addressed below.
9. Earlier false flag operations, below.
10. LBJ had supported Zionist interests from an early age. His aunt, Jessi Hunter Johnson, belonged to the Zionist Organization of America. Morris Smith suggested in 5 Towns Jewish Times, “Our First Jewish president Lyndon Johnson? An update!!” April 11, 2013, that LBJ’s maternal great-grandparents, the Huffmans, were jewish. It appeared a little speculative from what Smith disclosed, but if true, would make LBJ one fourth jewish.
11. National Security Adviser Walter Rostow, and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (3rd highest position) Eugene Rostow were jewish. Nicholas Katzenbach, Undersecretary of State (2nd highest position) was shown as Episcopalian, but the National Jewish Welfare Board listed him during WW II. Ancestry.com. U.S., WWII Jewish Servicemen Cards, 1942-1947. PM Eschol was at the LBJ ranch in 1966.

If a nuclear bombing drill was occurring on the carrier USS American, it could have been scheduled to provide a plausible explanation for the loading–intended all along to turn into the real thing. That might be more likely if tactical, rather than Armageddon nukes were being loaded. Compare the shadow drills and other parallel activity addressed by Webster Tarpley in Synthetic Terror, as common ploys in false flag operations. During 9/11 these drills were Amalgam Virgo and Vigilant Guardian.

The thought of nukes in that theater is not out of scale, because the Soviets were contemplating dropping them on Israel’s coast, where 90% of the population lives, if Israel and the US attacked Syria. War College, id, p 3 and 8.

Other false flag, or partially false flag , operations have included the standing down of defenses at Pearl Harbor by FDR, nephew of the original vice chairman of the federal reserve, Frederic Delano. Robert B. Stinnett, Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor. The stand down is addressed in more detail, under Deep Historical Notes, Pearl Harbor to USS Liberty to 9/11 above.  The stand down  forced the 88% of Americans who opposed involvement in the war in Europe into the fray. Ultimately, at Potsdam and Yalta, FDR threw half of Europe under the boot of the church and business hating Soviets, who had been financed and led largely by ethnic and observant jews, mostly from the U.S. and Germany, from the beginning, as addressed in the 9/11 page above.  The scale of the Bolshevik and Soviet genocides was much worse than the Nazis.

Others include the Gulf of Tonkin incident, mostly trumped up, and possibly the sinking of the Maine. Domestically, the JFK assassination was a massive coup d’ etat, as laid out in the 9 part documentary, The Men Who Killed Kennedy. Part 9 is a controversial set of interviews, casting LBJ in an extremely sinister light, matching Alex Jones’ second hand quotes of LBJ below about “that goddamn ship going to the bottom.” Harold Weisberg’s series of books, and others, have also laid out the coup d’ etat.

Another example is 9/11, a false flag operation to set up Zionist-imperialist aggression in the middle east, referenced above.

June 7 and 8

On the Eve

The Tito Howard documentary Avenging the Liberty (part 5, 2:22), focuses on a Major Seth Mintz, who claimed he was in a war room meeting, in which the markings and the flags had the brass convinced the ship was American, and the attack order was given. Survivor and Liberty author James Ennes says Mintz’ comments were taped. wrmea.org, June, 1992. Evans & Novak ran a story based on Mintz’ comments in 1991. Mintz later recanted, explaining he did not need Mossad and Shin Bet at his door. Cristol contests Mintz’ credibility on other grounds as well, Id, 130-136, pointing to a need for corroborative evidence.

As to the recanting, the reader might note the Talmudic law of the mosser, which prohibits a jew from reporting a jew to authorities, under penalty of rotting in hell. One who hits other people, or otherwise engages in acts of violence against people, may be informed on, which might appear to strip away the right of any plotters here, to expect silence by Mintz. However, in a difficult situation, one might drop back to the old Talmudic characterizations of gentiles as livestock, thus deeming the mosser available to the plotters. This might explain the otherwise quixotic declaration of Uri Meretz, the intelligence officer who debriefed MTB crews, that the Liberty looked like El Quseir, a livestock freighter.

“Old” Talmudic does not necessarily mean “gone.” Ovadia Yosef was Sephardi Chief Rabbi of Israel from 1973 to 1983. In a 1999 sermon, while still active and 14 years before his death in 2013, he said “The sole purpose of non-Jews is to serve Jews”. He said that Gentiles served a divine purpose: “Why are Gentiles needed? They will work, they will plow, they will reap. We will sit like an effendi and eat. That is why Gentiles were created.”

In a 2010 Jerusalem Post interview, Yosef was quoted as comparing Gentiles to donkeys whose life has the sole purpose to serve the master: “In Israel, death has no dominion over them… With gentiles, it will be like any person – they need to die, but [God] will give them longevity. Why? Imagine that one’s donkey would die, they’d lose their money. This is his servant… That’s why he gets a long life, to work well for this Jew. Gentiles were born only to serve us. Without that, they have no place in the world – only to serve the People of Israel.”^[

The statements were publicly condemned, but between 273,000 and 850,000 attended his funeral, possibly the largest ingathering of jews since the Second Temple. Wikipedia, Ovadia Yoseph. About 58% of the 6.2 million jews in Israel are not “secular”. Thus, the 850,000 would be about 23% of the religious jews in the country attending. www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3890330,00.html

Of the five recognized views on whether the Mosser applies even in a just society, two say it still does. Other nuances not vetted in this site, such as wartime conditions, might apply. See Rabbi Broyde, Halakic prohibition that a Jew cannot inform on another Jew. No doubt the severity of the law of the mosser, along with the ambiguity of the exceptions, often deters witnesses as intended, thus helping leverage jewish power over time.

A more complete discussion of the two sets of rules is set out under the sections of Historical Notes, addressing Torah, Talmud and Early 20th Century.

Alan Hart, id, wrote of an unauthenticated CIA report, that an officer at the meeting reacted to the order to sink the ship with no survivors, by saying “That’s pure murder.” Ftn x. This was CIA intelligence memorandum SC No. 01415/67, Ennes, Assault on the Liberty, 1979, id, p. 214.

First hand accounts from the Crewdson article , along with some of the tapes actually released, corroborate Mintz and the CIA report regarding high level decisions made, as addressed below. So do the comments by Adm Moorer, that jamming and coordinating of air and sea forces both require involvement at the top.

The Morning of June 8

The Israelis did eight flyovers, with 13 laps around the ship, between 6 am and 12:15 pm, under clear skies. They claim some of those may been coincidental, mainly looking for submarines, etc.

The Liberty was a WW II Victory hull, weighing 10,400 tons or so, converted to one of the U.S.’s most advanced spy ships. It was covered with 45 antennas and discs (Cristol, id, p 84), including a 16 foot micro-dish, present on only two ships in the world, the other being its sister ship, the USS Belmont. As Admiral Moorer explained in a book signing ceremony for Liberty officer James Ennes, it looked like a lobster. It had just 4 guns, all 50 caliber, to repel boardings. The hull number, GTR-5, was in 8 foot and 4 foot tall white letters or larger, on both sides of the gray bow, with USS Liberty in 18″ letters across the stern. The hull number is the license plate. GTR means Auxilliary Technical Research, which is noncombatant, and matches the lack of significant armament, the 45 antennas and the huge discs.

The IDF command put out the word in advance that the targeted ship was the El Quseir, a moth balled Egyptian livestock transport, that had no resemblance in size, silhouette, etc to the Liberty.  This was a cynical and arrogant gesture, tied to talmudic descriptions of gentiles as cattle, still voiced for example by chief Sephardic Rabbi Josef as late as 2010.  it probably was intended to make it easier for the Israeli servicemen to wipe it out, with all hands.  Compare Gaza, in 2023 and 2024, planned and started when Israel was formed.

All crew members maintain the flag was up, in a steady breeze, though Israel has disputed that. At 9 am, when the Liberty dropped to 5 knots and turned west, Ensign Ennis observed it standing out in 8 knots of relative wind. Assault on the Liberty, id, p 52. When the swept wing fighters circled three times at about 10 am, the flag was still standing out. id, p 53. At about 10:30, the flying boxcars circled again, though closer. The flag was still good. Id, 54.

Ennis filed an affidavit with the Board of Inquiry, showing the hourly logs had the relative wind at about 8 knots most of the morning, and 12 knots close to the attack. Id, p. 152. Four other witnesses testified at the Naval Bd of Inquiry that the flag was standing out, and the Board was given a report of an intercept of 2 or 3 IDF identification passes, observing an American flag. (According to Ennis, this was all kept out of the report, or labeled “top secret.” Id, p 152. After the event, the Pentagon told the media the flag “may have hung limp and unrecognizable at the mast.” Id, p 128.)

Israel has pointed to gun camera photos from their fighter planes, as proving no flag was displayed. However, Ken Halliwell has exposed (no pun intended) the photos as frauds based on a number of indicators, pending peer review. Mr Cristol also put a bogus photo, purporting to show absence of a flag, on the front of his book, but removed that photo from the 2013 edition.

The flyovers were described by Hart, id.

The first was by a Nord 2051, a flying boxcar which circled three times near 6 am. It was carrying photographers, as observed by the officer of the deck, Ensign John Scott, through binoculars. The Nord reported to Israel’s Central Coastal Command citing “a supply ship of the US Navy” at 6:03. USSLibertyveterans.org/ links/ The USS Liberty Memorial Website/ Summary of Formal War Crimes Report, ftnote 12, Exhibit 2-268. “Though the pilot did not report seeing a flag, he made out the hull marking ‘GTR-5,’ which was enough for Israeli commanders to identify the ship as the USS Liberty and to mark it as a neutral vessel on their control board. Oren, id.

As reflected in a CIA report of July 27, 1967, a confidential Israeli source was emphatic, that Israel knew what kind of ship the Liberty was, and what it was doing. Ennes, Assault on the Liberty, id, p. 213.

At 7:20, aware they were being carefully scrutinized, new officer of the deck James Ennes replaced the flag, sooted during the trip out, with a clean 5 x 8 flag up the main mast.

At 9 am, per orders, and as referenced above, the Liberty turned right and doubled back 5 miles west, to a point 30 miles from Israel’s coast. That was a good point from which to monitor on land movements. One Israeli jet watched the turn from a distance, but the Liberty was unable to identify it. thelibertyincident.com timeline, Jay Cristol, p 16. At 10 am two Mirage fighters loaded with rockets circled the Liberty 3 times, close enough that Ennes and others on the bridge could see the pilots, through binoculars. They could see no markings on the jets, Ennis, id, 153.

Then the Nords came back three times, starting at 10:30, at rough hourly intervals. The first passed about 200 feet right overhead. Hart, id. At least a few crewmen, such as Lt Lloyd Painter, and Ensign Ennis saw markings on one or more of the Nords. War College pamphlet, ftn 33, 34.

At 10:55 a.m, a naval liaison officer at Israeli Air Force headquarters informed Israeli Naval Headquarters that the previously unidentified ship is an “audio-surveillance ship of the U.S. Navy” named Liberty.

The naval intelligence officer who debriefed crews, Uri Meretz, looked up the Liberty in Janes Fighting Ships, and passed the word to intelligence headquarters, that the Liberty looked like the Egyptian horse cavalry transport El Quseir. Cristol, p. 21.

El Quseir had displacement of 2,640 tons vs 10,680 tons for the Liberty (less than 25%) and a length of 275 ft, vs 465 ft for the Liberty (about 60%). Cristol, p. 84. Silhouettes, modified to portray as equal sized, are at Cristol, p. 160. El Quseir also lacked any of the antennas or discs, and was not a Victory hull. As the 28 page summary report of the Naval Board of Inquiry pointed out, quoting directly from the top secret one, any similarity was “highly superficial.” Ennis, id, p. 161. Moreover, as also pointed out in the summary report, the El Quseir could not logically have been suspected of the shore bombardment, because it only had two 3- pounders. Ennis, id, p. 161.

In spite of the minimal similarity, three hours later each of the three MTB’s “independently” identified the Liberty as El Quseir, before launching their torpedoes. Was Meretz leading the choir? Might a sinking with all hands sit better on the conscience, with a livestock transport in the mind’s eye, under the old Talmudic portrayal of gentiles as livestock?

At 11 a.m, the acting chief of Israeli naval operations ordered removal of the LIberty from the board  because he “was no longer certain of its position.” Crewdson, id. “No longer certain of its position” apparently reflected a policy of removing vessels from the board after 5 hrs, under the assumption they normally would have moved out of the area by then. War College, id, p. 8. (11 am is 5 hours after the 6 am identification, and at 15 knots, it could have moved 75 miles away. However, at 6 am it was moving east, ie, closer to the war zone, and in fact was 25-30 miles closer by 11 am!)

It also made no sense to remove it from the board here, however, because the Israelis had circled it all morning, including less than half an hour before the 10:55 dialogue. Removing it could make sense, only if the navy and air force were not talking to each other about last known position, which seems unlikely. You would think that at 10:55, since they were talking anyway, the air force would have told the navy about the position during the 10:30 fly over. Seth Mintz claimed it was never removed. Cristol, p 131. After the fact, they would almost have to claim they removed it, because otherwise, they had zero excuse for the attack.

Just 24 minutes after the Liberty was (reportedly) removed from the board, at 11:24, someone blew up the ammo dumps. War College, Cristol p18, Oren, id. Cristol writes in 2013, 46 years later, that it was either IDF doing clean up, or sappers. Id, p 34. It is remarkable that clean-up has still not been ruled out, since that should be easy to verify. Also, shelling would be more likely to land near a target, and we have no indication of that either. The explosions , especially if not checked out carefully, did provide a convenient excuse to target the Liberty, and that is what happened. Three torpedo boats (MTB’s) were sent after the ship on the horizon.

The torpedo boats did not depart until 40 minutes after the explosions (War College, p 8). What checking was done, if any, with on shore sources? Why not use a telescope or binoculars from a mile to five miles away, to read the 4 to 8 foot tall letters or flag, and look for big sea to shore guns? Take a copy of Jane’s Fighting Ships with you? Contact the Liberty with VHF or UHF radio, which has a range of about 16 miles, other ship to shore radio, or a 12 inch signaling light, with a range of about 14 miles? “Identify yourself or we are about to attack you, spy ship or not ”

Israel had told the US any ship sailing at over 20 knots would be deemed a combatant and sunk (War College, p 8). U.S Navy ships assumed a warship at 25 knots. Cristol, p. 39. The Liberty’s top speed was 18 knots with the governors disabled. It was going 15 knots at 6 am (Cristol, p. 40) and slowed to 5 knots at 9 am, according to Cristol’s timeline, as it began its patrol. The Naval Board of Inquiry found its speed at 5 knots when attacked. However, Israel’s MTBs claimed it was sailing at 28 or 30 knots, after several computations at 1:47 pm. Cristol timeline, id. If the 28 to 30 knot measurements were accurate or due to credible errors, that could (A) put the Liberty far enough above the 20 and 25 knot break points in the minds of the Israelis, to provide clearer justification for an attack, and (B) leverage the prospect of the mystery ship getting away, set ting up air force involvement (Cristol, p 20). (The top speed of the MTB’s was 42 knots, just 12 over the 30 [Cristol, p 35].)

“Measure twice, cut once,” to analogize from workshops, is almost always enough–unless someone really wants the bad measurement to stick. The three MTB’s had a total of 45 officers and men, and Israel is saying the best speed measurement they could come up with was 5 or 6 times the actual speed.

The acting Israeli naval chief also removed it from the board, because it was “far from the theatre of battle.” Central Coastal Command record 2-678, id. Too far to keep track, but not too far to attack?? Since it was coming east at 6 am at about 15 knots, and by 11 am would be about 75 miles closer, one would think the need to keep track was greater, not less by then, as referenced above.

The Approach

At 1:51, control told the Mirage fighters approaching the ship “If it’s a warship, then blast it.” Thelibertyincident.com/timeline (Cristol). Chief Air Controller Kislev has pointed out, there were no other warships in the area. Cristol, p. 48. Blasting any ship without identifying it, including whose ship, is a war crime. Know your target. If you fly by, see no big guns that could have bombed the shore, and draw no anti-aircraft fire, what is the hurry to blast it? As one of the officers at headquarters had pointed out, it is unlikely Egypt would have sent such a ship out there alone.

At 1:56 pm, the fighters and MTB’s were in communication with each other, and the Mirages reached the Liberty. Cristol, p. 21. Kenneth Halliwell, “the USS Liberty Attack as Witnessed by the Lead Attack Pilot“, USS Libertyinquiry/essay28.

In the 2009 autobiography of the lead attack pilot (later General) Iftach Spector, he wrote “Control passed us through to the general maritime radio channel, but those who answered us on it were from the Israeli Navy. This ship never answered any radio calls.” Loud and Clear: The Memoir of an Israeli Fighter Pilot, p 132. However, Official IDF reports and the IAF transcript say nothing about any attempt, by any component of the IDF, to communicate with the ship via radio. Also, there is no mention of a radio communication attempt in the U.S. Navy’s Court of Inquiry record of testimony and exhibits. Loud and Clear: The Memoir of an Israeli Fighter Pilot, p 132.

Spector also wrote “I began transmitting the physical description [of the ship] to air control and the navy. I described the shape of the hull, the lines of the forward superstructure, stacks, and mast. … The conversation between the air controller and me lasted five to six minutes, in which time we made two full circles of the vessel. …I came in low and flew parallel to the right side of the ship. Only then did I see the lettering ‘CTR5’ on its side. I spelled it to air control. ‘Charlie Tango Roger five’…..Another pilot who came after I left read it as G-TR5…” after a pause, the controller said it had been in action against our forces in El Arish. Go ahead and attack. Loud and Clear, p 133.

That also contrasts with the official Israeli Air Force transcript of air-to-ground communications, which contains only the following statements attributed to Spector, as he attempts to quickly identify the ship immediately before attacking: “I can’t identify it, but in any case it’s a military ship. It has one mast and one smokestack. It has one mast up front.” Cristol, p. 21. As referenced above, attacking without identifying is a war crime, just like attacking an essentially unarmed neutral vessel in international waters.

The official transcript revealed only a minute of conversation, not five or six, suggesting that the conversation Spector discussed in his book was blocked out of the official record. Kenneth Halliwell, “the USS Liberty Attack as Witnessed by the Lead Attack Pilot“, USS Libertyinquiry/essay28.

Ennis reports, in an addendum to the 2007 edition of his book, “Shortly after Assault on the Liberty was first published, I was contacted by an Israeli pilot named Evan Tovni who called from New York to say that he flew the first attacking Mirage. On his first pass, he said, he saw the American flag and asked his headquarters for instructions. “Attack,” he was told. He refused to do so and returned to headquarters, where he was arrested. His wingmen followed orders and continued the attack.” War College, id, p. 9, ftn 45.

Mr. Crewdson tells us about a 2004 transcript, made by a Jerusalem Post reporter, Arieh O’Sullivan, who was allowed to listen to what the Israeli Air Force said were tapes of the attacking pilots’ communications. At 1:54 p.m. local time, two minutes before the Israeli jets began their first strafing run, a weapons system officer on the ground suddenly blurted out, “What is this? Americans?” “Where are Americans?” replied one of the air controllers. The question went unanswered, and it was not asked again. Crewdson, id.

However, note Crewdson credited the accuracy of the Cristol translation of this transcript to English. Israeli translator Bregman sharply criticized Cristol for omitting the controller response, “I didn’t say”, with a tone suggesting he knew, but did not want to say. See From Whence Cristol, below. Bregman gave another example of what he viewed as a pattern of aggressive editing by Cristol (changing “probably American” to “Possibly American”). That also matches Cristol’s gross mischaracterization of Adm Staring’s complaints as clerical, under Naval Board of Inquiry, also below under The Coverup.

Several pilots protested, and the controller told them to follow orders. The persons listening included U.S. Air Force intelligence analysts Steve Forslund, James Gotcher and Richard Block, each of whom picked up the traffic from different locations. Air Force intelligence analyst Steve Forslund says the controller told them to sink it and leave no survivors, and got agitated when they were unable to do so quickly. James Gotcher says when the Liberty was able to get off a distress call, the controller panicked and told them to complete the job and get out of there.

The comments of Forslund and Gotcher match up with the second hand CIA report, that one of the high ranking officers in the meeting in which the attack was planned said “This is pure murder.” Hart, id, ftn x. (However, did the fighter/bombers have enough ordinance to sink the ship? If not, were the controllers , whom Forslund and Gotcher heard, merely unaware the MTB’s were to do the actual sinking? That is, that the fighter bombers had no 500 lb bombs or preferred air to surface missiles, for that purpose?)

Also, second hand from a Libyan navy captain through a CIA officer, and English transcripts shown to Dwight Porter, US Ambassador to Lebanon, disclosed by Porter to two sources. CIA officer Haviland Smith, assigned to Beirut at the time, believes the transcripts were destroyed. Israeli diplomats also cabled each other that 5 days after the attack, the Americans had clear proof the pilot “discovered the identity of the ship and continued the attack anyway.”

Oliver Kirby, Deputy Director of Operations for NSA recalled the pilot saying “yes, yes, it’s a US flag.” Crewdson, id. NSA has posted 3 tapes on its website, but denies any were made during the attack, until after the torpedo hit. The NSA tech who recorded two of those three posted tapes, Michael Prostinak, was 15,000 feet above the Liberty, could tell from the id number of a posted tape beginning at 2:29 pm, just after the torpedo struck, that the preceeding tape was the one recording it.

Prostinak did send a note to Cristol in 2009, saying the tapes he reviewed “clearly show the attack was a mistake.” Cristol, p. 231. Is this the law of the mosser again; was Prostinak referring to the tapes actually released by the NSA; or did he mean by “mistake”, something they should not have done?

The cable from the ambassador may have referred to a twenty minute gap in the (Israeli) tapes, that the Americans knew about. One assumes, NSA gapped or destroyed its own tapes to match, per Haviland Smith.

Aerial and MTB Attacks

At about 2:00 pm (Cristol, p. 46.) at least two Mirages, each armed with 72 rockets, two 30 mm cannons and machine guns, streaked in from every direction. The 30 mm rounds were about 2 and a half times as large as the 50 caliber rounds the Liberty carried. They killed 3 seamen manning the machine guns and two on the bridge, strafed the decks, took out the operative antennas, and shot the ship above the waterline full of holes with rocket, cannon and machine gun fire. After seven minutes, when the Mirages were done, Chief Controller Kislev ordered the Mysteres to attack. Cristol, p. 46. The Mystere fighters attacked for another 20 minutes, dumping two canisters of napalm on the bridge and deck, setting it on fire; blasting more 8 inch holes in the bulkheads with rockets; and firing machine guns. Howard, part 2 at 1:56. The Mysteres also tried to take out the boilers. Cristol, p. 47. Eight men were killed by the two waves of fighters, and many wounded. Exhibit 2-268, id, ftnote 19.

(The US later ratified a 1980 UN weapons convention, but is not party to Protocol III, which forbids napalming civilians. Apply to napalming decks of an unarmed research ship of a neutral party, carrying civilian NSA workers, in international waters.)

jamming

Lt Commander David Lewis, the ship’s chief intelligence officer, pointed out that heat seeking missiles took out the tuners of all the working antennas within a few seconds. Avenging the Liberty , id Part 3 at 5:40. The repeated casing of the ship by the photographers in the Nords made this possible. One whip antenna, taken down earlier due to performance problems, was undamaged. Radio man Terri Halbardier dragged some cable across the napalmed deck, got the spared antenna working, and tried to get out a distress signal.

Both tactical and distress signals may have been jammed, the latter a war crime. Peter Hounam wrote in Operation Cyanide, id, “Liberty radioman Richard Sturman concluded that the attackers had carefully prepared for the attack with the specific intention of preventing the ship communicating with the outside world. To do so effectively they must have had prior knowledge from shore-based receivers of the five frequencies being used by the ship, so that jamming gear could be tuned to them. Sturman recalled his anger when he discovered that the international distress frequency, used for Mayday messages, was also jammed”.

According to Bryce Lockwood, the only marine of three on board who survived, the jamming fouled up the trajectory of the Mirage rockets, so the jamming was stopped during firing, and only then could the crew get the distress signal out, confirming Sturman. Lockwood was assigned to the spook shack.

Ken Halliwell, in ussliberty-inquiry.us, under jamming sounds, offers sound samples and other materials– including some, however, suggesting the jamming sounds may have been caused rather than interrupted by the rocket guidance systems, and were intermittent in nature. Chief Radioman Wayne Smith concluded there was jamming, but also identified a transmitter dial off one notch, as the problem with one frequency. Cristol, p. 44.

The Court of Inquiry report did find that the radios were apparently jammed, Ennis, id, errata to 2007 ed. Re p 75. 9:12 As Adm Moorer pointed out, “The jamming had to be deliberate to American frequencies, undoubtedly ordered by high authorities. Why not jam Egyptian frequencies, if they though the ship was Egyptian? ” Avenging the Liberty , id, part 3, 8:44.

The distress signal was picked up by the Israelis and the carrier USS Saratoga at about 2:10. Cristol timeline. Fighters were launched from the U.S.S. American to assist. (They were called back minutes later by Fleet Admiral Martin, as addressed below.)

The MTB’s

At 2:11, Israeli navy control told the MTB’s the fighters were on their final run, and the MTBs were now to attack. Cristol timeline. All these waves–the Mirages, the Mysteres, the MTB’s and then the large helicopters, showed up at the right time to do their job. The fighter bombers would take out communication, shoot the ship full of rocket , cannon and machine gun holes, and suppress deck activity, such as repairs; the MTB’s would blast more holes in the bulkheads, sink the ship with torpedoes, and destroy life rafts and whaleboats; and the commandos in the helicopters would finish off any survivors. David Lewis, in Avenging the Liberty, part 3 id at 4:53.

At the same moment, a Mirage reported to air force control “Homeland from Royal, do you read me? Pay attention, this ships markings are CharlieTango Romeo 5. Pay attention, Homeland, Charlie Tango Romeo 5. There is no flag on her!” Cristol, p. 47.

Also at about that time, the three MTB crews each decided independently that the ship was the livestock transport, El Quseir. Cristol, p. 55. They ruled out an Egyptian destroyer, because there were no substantial gun mounts. Id. See references above to Talmudic prompting by Uri Meretz.

At 2:17, the MTB’s were told not to attack, but at 2:18 MTB squad commander Oren, in one of the MTBs, ordered the attack.

At 2:24, the MTBs reported that the ship might be a commercial or supply vessel, and they were not sure. Cristol timeline. At 2:26, the Liberty crew also noticed the 5 x 8 flag was shot away, and put up the holiday flag, which is 7 x 13. Cristol timeline.

AA flashes?

2:28, the MTB commander says he flashed “AA”, meaning “identify yourself”, to the Liberty, and could only see “AA” in their response, due to dense smoke from the burning Liberty whale boat which the Israelis had shot up. Cristol, p. 53-55. Orem had worked with the AA signal 11 years earlier. His destroyers had sent the signal to an Egyptian ship, which responded with the same. His destroyers responded by opening fire, disabling and capturing the vessel. Cristol, p 6. One would think that one or the other would give their identity momentarily, rather than proceed to attack upon the first fumbled response.

Moreover, Admiral Kidd investigated this point separately from the Court of Inquiry proceedings, and his findings were reported to Washington by message on July 6, 1967, almost a month after the attack. Kidd determined that no “AA” signal was sent. Even if “AA” had been sent, however, the signal should not have caused the attack. According to the Navy Historian and other experts, “AA” is merely an invitation to communicate. It has never meant “identify yourself” as the Israelis claim. Ennis, id, addendum to 2007 edition.

At that point, the MTBs were 1 to 2 miles away. Cristol timeline.

At 2:30, Israel dispatched helicopters toward the Liberty as an “attacked warship.”

At about the same time, the Liberty opened fire briefly with their 50 caliber machine guns on the MTB’s, perceived to be in attack mode (wedge formation, high speed). Cristol, p. 54. The firing by the Liberty before the torpedo hit was probably just a quick burst or two by machine gun 151, and the firing by machine gun 153 may well have been after the torpedo hit the Liberty. The Navy Bd of Inquiry failed to include testimony from either surviving seaman who operated the machine guns, Larkins or Quintero. Ussliberty-inquiry.us/who fired first? USS Liberty or Israel’s torpedo boats? The news release by the Dept of Defense, with the public release of the Bd of Inquiry report, said the Liberty fired at the aircraft and torpedo boats, “but only after she had been attacked and hit.” Cristol, id, p. 159.

“Radarman Charles Cocnavitch tells us that Seaman Quintero fired on the center torpedo boat just as that boat fired its torpedo at us, causing the center boat to swerve into the path of another torpedo boat, which also swerved, thereby spoiling the aim of both boats. Thus Quintero’s gunfire may have been the most important single act of the day, saving the ship.” Ennis, id, errata to 2007 ed, re p 88.

Cristol treated the burst or bursts of fire by the Liberty as cutting off any duty of the MTB’s to hold off on the torpedoes. Id, p. 54. Bear in mind, sitting before the MTB’s was an isolated and essentially unarmed ship that was all shot up, and smoking like a chimney, with a top speed less than half the MTB’s. “After we beat you to a pulp with planes in a surprise attack, and came at you again at high speed with torpedo boats in attack mode, you took a feeble swing or two back, so we have no choice but to sink you.”

The MTB’s could have spread out and triangulated the Liberty, assuring the intended sinking. Cristol, id, p. 203. The unexpectedly successful SOS, however, created time pressure.

The Liberty records it was hit by a torpedo, one of five fired, at 2:35, and Israel shows 2:40. It blew a 40 foot hole in the ship, instantly killing 26 more people, mostly civilian intelligence workers. It struck a structural stanchion, which kept it from blowing a comparable hole on the other side, and sinking the vessel for sure. Crewdson, id. The torpedo boats then closed in, blasting armour piercing rounds into the bulkheads. The captain later determined that not a single compartment had escaped penetration. Avenging the Liberty , part 2 at 1:40. With the Liberty listing 10%, the captain called to abandon ship.

the life rafts

However, the MTB’s machine gunned two of the three life rafts in the water, and took the third on board. Israel has denied closing and shooting at the ship and rafts, but Ambassador Oren admits to the closing and strafing. Unfriendly Fire, id., as also documented by Ennis, id, at p 91-96. The witnessing by Thomas Smith of shooting up the life rafts is at pp 95-96. Lt JG Painter also said:

“1515 Hours: I climbed the ladder and opened the hatch to the main deck. I wanted to see if it was safe enough to bring the wounded sailors out onto the main deck. What I saw sent ice running through my veins. The life rafts were either destroyed or had been cut loose and had floated away.

I personally observed an Israeli MTB methodically machine gun one of the Liberty’s empty life rafts that had been cut loose and was floating in the water. I knew at that split second that the thrust of the IDF attack was to kill every American sailor on board. There were to be no survivors that day.” Lloyd C. Painter recalls USS Liberty, USSliberty.org Painter’s testimony and other evidence about shooting up the life rafts was removed from the Naval Bd of Inquiry report.

According to Ennis, id, Errata to 2007 ed, re p 96, Americo Aimetti, Phil Tourney and Al Easton also witnessed the shooting of the life rafts, and all are prepared and willing to so testify under oath if asked.

The two whale boats had already been shot full of holes, while still unlaunched. The abandon order was reversed.

the helicopters

As the MTB’s left the area, the Liberty crew saw two large helicopters, with a capacity of 30 people each. According to Ennis, they were full of men in battle dress, and the announcing system began to broadcast “Stand By to Repel Boarders!” which was echoed by sailors scrambling around the ship. Id, p 96. U.S. signalman Joe Meadors says he saw a very large helicopter hovering next to the ship, with doors open, and a large number of men inside carrying automatic weapons. Avenging the Liberty, id, part 3 at 4:41.

At 3:07, Liberty crewmen saw a star of David on the helicopters. Cristol, p. 27.

The Cristol timeline lays out a fair amount of Israeli internal communication, addressing identifying the nationality of the ship, and where to take survivors.

At 3:12, IDF recorded the ship as American. The helicopters were informed at 3:14, and told to return home. Cristol, p 28. They hovered momentarily, and departed.

If the ongoing discussion about rescuing survivors were legit, one would think they might have transported some then, especially the wounded– unless the choppers were in fact full of commandos, and the Israelis did not want the Americans to see that (ie, discussion of transporting survivors not legit, just making a record), or they presumed the Americans would refuse to board, after sharply rejecting help from the MTBs.

Israel informed the American ambassador they had mistakenly attacked a U.S. ship.

6th Fleet Response

In response to the 2:10 may day, Vice Adm Martin, commander of the 6th Fleet, ordered both the U.S.S. American and the U.S.S. Saratoga carriers to launch F4 Phantom fighters. This was done through Adm Geis, who was over both carriers.

Even if the Phantoms were launched within 5 minutes (2:15) and reached max speed of 585 mph instantly, it is very unlikely, by hindsight, they would have arrived before the torpedo struck. “Liberty was simply too far from the aircraft carriers for timely arrival of defensive air support, although, because the scope and ultimate duration of the attack was unknowable at the time, it was reasonable to dispatch aircraft, regardless of distance and associated flight-time.” Holliwell, id, 6th Fleets Attempt to Defend Liberty. (The unexpectedly successful SOS put the Israelis in the same trick bag, and thus, hurrying to finish the job.)

America commander Donald Engen later wrote “At [the time of the attack, USS] America was conducting a … no-launch weapons readiness drill, which involved the movement of many different weapons about the flight and hangar decks… In America there ensued about an hour’s effort to move some bombs below and bring up others and to launch four A-4Cs fully loaded along with F-4B escorts. That group was judged to be the correct size for a response — not too large and warlike, but still large enough to protect Liberty.” Wings and Warriors, My Life as a Naval Aviator , ISBN 9781560987710, Harper Collins, 1999, cited in ussliberty-inquiry.us, id.

The Saratoga was not tangled in a training drill, and launched more quickly, but the launches from both carriers were recalled by Adm Geis before they could get into formation. More below.

Nukes on the planes?

It is possible that some of the planes when first launched carried nuclear missiles, or much more likely, nuclear missiles were involved in the training mentioned by Engen.

At page 76 of his 1979 book, Ennis, id. said the “ready craft” that were launched carried nuclear missiles, normally in place on such “ready craft.” Survivor Phil Tourney, in his book What I Saw That Day, says two of the Phantoms were loaded with nuclear tipped missiles, headed for Cairo. Lt Cmdr Lewis recorded notes from a conversation with Admn Geis, just after the attack, in which Geis said Washington might have been concerned that the first launch included nuclear missiles. Wikipedia, USS Liberty incident, US rescue attempts. In a July 1, 2015 interview with Paul Jay of realnews.com, Bryce Lockwood said: “Joe Tully was Skipper of the U.S.S. Saratoga. He came to our 25th reunion in Rapid City, S.D., and Captain Tully told me personally that there had–the aircraft which he had initially launched had some nuclear weapons aboard them.”

However, In an addendum to the 2007 edition of his book, Ennis said:

“It is clear that I was mistaken about the aircraft involved, as F4s do not carry nuclear weapons. Others tell me that the aircraft that were launched carried Bullpup missiles, which might easily be mistaken for nuclear bombs. And we learned much later that the USS America was involved in a nuclear weapons loading drill at the very time the ship learned of the attack on the Liberty and that this drill is one factor that delayed America’s response to our call for help. It is also possible that those were the weapons seen by our sources.”

Never before….

The most troubling question is why McNamara ordered Geis to recall the first launch, if not due to the nuclear payloads. Never before, in the history of the U.S. Navy! (Moorer Report, para. 6). The Liberty had not been able to identify the attackers; the 6th Fleet operators could hear the rockets ripping through the ship in the background; and the expected duration of the attack was unknown. If triggering a war was the fear, the Phantoms could have been left in route, while McNamara tried to identify and talk the attackers off, or the Phantoms could do the same or drive them off if necessary, when they reached the Liberty.

Geis was so incredulous when the second launch was also called back, that after McNamara told Geis the president would rather see the Liberty go to the bottom than embarrass Israel, Geis asked to speak to McNamara’s commanding officer! Alex Jones says Jones talked to many of the admirals involved, and LBJ told Geis he “wanted that goddamn ship on the bottom. No help. Recall the wings.” Video, Terrorstorm, at 3:17.

Some claim Jones  is more of a shill for the Anti Defamation League than he appears–his wife before the divorce is jewish; he broadcasted from a jewish owned radio network; and his personal lawyer also represented a Bronfman.  See article by a man raised orthodox jewish, Nathanael Kaplan.   If true, the hyperbole might have been aimed at shifting the blame from Israel to LBJ.

Others are saying the second launch was recalled, because the white house had received the “my bad” message of Israel, which makes sense.

The Coverup

Was this a botched false flag operation involving the white house, and then a frantic effort to cover it up? Or an immediate decision to forgive and forget for a country, with too much control over the U.S.?

The lone antenna resurrection, the torpedo hitting the stanchion, the failure of rockets to penetrate the boiler, possibly the Quintero gunbursts– if any one of these had gone the other way, the Liberty likely would have gone down, with all hands.

The formal proceedings touching on the event are links in the Wikipedia article, USS Liberty incident. Cristol’s refrain about “ten investigations” all concluding mistaken identity, etc does not bear up, as addressed below.

Naval Board of Inquiry.

On June 10, Adm McCain (John’s father), Commander of the Naval forces in Europe, ordered Adm Kidd to conduct a Naval Board Inquiry. The court, which was purely advisory, included Kidd and two captains. McCain gave a week, for a task Kidd and Cpt. Ward Boston, senior counsel to the inquiry, thought should take 6 months. War College, id, p. 12, Jan 8, 2004 declaration of Boston. It was an on board inquiry, examining no surveillance records, and with no testimony from or cross exam of Israelis or surveillance personnel.

Kidd took two days of testimony on board. Twelve hours of that were from Cpt McGonigle and Ensign Lucas, who worked the bridge. Some questions were asked of 12 other officers and men. The court of inquiry asked for additional time beyond the week, and it was denied. Letter of Adm Merlin Starling of Sept 30, 2006. The inquiry concluded it was a case of mistaken identity.

It was tendered to Adm Staring, future Judge Advocate General of the Navy, for review. Staring was given less than a day (18 hours, to review 650 pages). He later said it was the only time a report was ever withdrawn from him, out of hundreds he had reviewed, before he had been able to finish. He had only gotten through about a third of it, when Adm McCain took it away. He was certain it was withdrawn from him, because he told Cpt Boston he was having serious problems with the evidence available to support the findings of fact, including mistaken identity. USS Liberty Coverup–” The Loss of Liberty” video by David Strader, 35:21.

Cristol’s 2013 edition says Staring was merely “not happy with the form of the untidy, bulky document, which contained typographical errors.” p. 157.

The report was labeled top secret for ten years. (When a document is classified, the classification of the most sensitive content is applied to the entire document. Hoppe, id para. 3 b. )

Kidd talked to the crew in small groups, and told them not to speak or write to anyone, including each other and their spouses, about the incident. If they did, he would personally see that they faced “court martial, imprisonment, or worse.” Terri Halbardier, Avenging of the Liberty, id, part 3 at 3:30, and others.

Cpt Boston’s 2004 declaration said he and Kidd were certain the attack was not an accident; that Adm McCain adamantly denied the request to take testimony from Israelis; that Kidd was ordered by Johnson and McNamara to find the attack was a case of mistaken identity; that the testimony of Lloyd Painter about strafing of the life rafts had been excised from the report Boston and Kidd submitted; that Adm Kidd spoke only negatively of Mr. Cristol; and Cristol’s notes of conversations with Boston were inaccurate.

Eventually, this report led to a figure of speech in American vernacular–“Are you kidding??” Just kidding.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

This report dealt just with communication systems failures, not culpability.

CIA

These reports, dated June 13 and 21, 1967 reviewed the Israeli inquiry findings, and concluded the attack had not been deliberate, but the misidentifications were incongruous and grossly negligent. CIA Director Richard Helms, in his 2003 book, A Look over my Shoulder, Random House, said it was premeditated.

Helms’ acknowledgement is consistent with the experience the Liberty’s Lt Bennett had had, after he became Commander Bennett, and moved to the NSA. He asked the CIA to look at the Liberty file. At first, he was asked “Why do you want to see it?” and “Will you guaranty the security of the material?” A week later the CIA called back, and said he must agree not to copy anything, or write anything for publication. Then the CIA called a third time, and said there is nothing to send–everything has been released.

Clark Clifford

Working unstaffed, Clifford was reporting for the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. He concluded “The unprovoked attack on the Liberty constitutes a flagrant act of gross negligence for which the Israeli Government should be held completely responsible, and the Israeli military personnel involved should be punished.” Cristol, id, p 162

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Shortly after the attack, this committee was addressing a defense foreign aid bill, directed at amending the foreign assistance act. Several senators asked McNamara some questions about the Liberty attack, said they did not have records requested, and were about to move on to something else. Wikipedia, USS Liberty incident, Cristol, id, p. 162.

Senate Armed Services Committee

On Feb 1, 1968, in a hearing on the USS Pueblo incident, a few questions were asked about the Liberty. Cristol, p. 164.

House Appropriations

This was a budget hearing in April, 1968 on military communications systems, where proof of problems enable the industrial side of the “military-industrial complex” to thrive. Their ship comes in, so to speak. Several witnesses pointed to the communication problems of the Liberty incident. Congressman Rhodes of Arizona said that in that incident , the navy was working with “the most sophisticated communications system ever known to mankind” Cristol, id, p 165. What does that suggest, about the supposed inability to get even one copy of any of 5 messages to the ultimate target (double meaning) over a period of a day or so, when the normal mouth to ear was 5 to 70 minutes? Id, p 167. Parts of those proceedings are still highly classified. Id, 166.

House Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee

This was an across the broad review in 1971 of military communications, including spy ships. Id, 166. Since the 5 to 70 minutes per message in 1967 should have been more than quick enough to get the Liberty out of harms way, it is of very little relevance.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Spurred partly by the Ennis book, this committee was the first one to send staff to Israel to take testimony, which it did beginning in 1979. Screens were in place blocking the view, between questioners and pilots. Id, 169. Can you imagine such a screen, in other contexts? Jury? Police investigation? If the questioner cannot even watch the witness during questioning, why not just talk on the phone? Was there a serious risk to the pilots, of the staff member being able to look at them? Cristol points out he was able to interview the pilots face to face, and is the only non-Israeli to do so. Id, 169. Does that match up with the comment of Adm Kidd, that he thought Cristol might be an Israeli agent? Boston declaration, para. 22.

The committee decided there was not enough evidence to warrant “pursuing charges”, and no report was filed. Id, 169. What about getting the truth out, and scorching them in the court of public opinion? Or is the court of public opinion so completely dominated by Zionist supporters, that that is a nonstarter? Remember, the original attack wound up as a short item on page 19 of The NY Times.

NSA

Gerhard and Millington prepared the NSA report in 1981, with parts released in 1983, and most recently in 2007, prior to the Crewdson piece. “A great deal” of it remains classified today. Id, 170. The released part accuses the Israelis of “egregious errors” in both command and operation. Id, p. 171.

House Armed Services Subcommittee on Investigations

The white house fielded a 1991 request from the Liberty Veterans Association to this committee, which borrowed Roy J. Kirk from the General Accounting Office, and obtained a top clearance for congressional staffer Warren Nelson. Nelson looked at unredacted NSA records and some other things, and the committee found nothing new. Id, 171. Cristol gives no information, as to how sharp or industrious Nelson or Kirby were.

Israeli Investigations

Jag Manual Report.

Due to loss of life and property damage, infantry officer Ron Ram was appointed to investigate, which he completed by June 16, finding a chain of battlefield errors, but no grounds to punish anyone. These errors included handling of the shelling report, the speed computations, and the identification as El Quseir. He also found the Liberty had put itself in harm’s way. Id, p. 173. These were addressed above.

Preliminary Inquiry Under Sec 283

Lt. Gen Rabin, as Chief of staff, ordered this, to avoid the appearance of short shrift. The judge, a Lt. Col in the IDF, found the ships similar enough to each other to justify the confusion. This finding shored up the Talmudic tune calling by Uri Meretz, and the dutiful harmonizing by the MTB crews identifying the ship. He had no evidence from the Americans. He found a reporting error regarding the presence of the Liberty, between two Israeli naval officers. Id, 176. Cpt Rehav, who ok’ed the torpedo launch, resigned from the navy after the war, though not punished or fired. Id, 178.

Israel Defense Force Dept of Combat History

Apparently, this report, The Attack on the Liberty Incident, makes reference to the Select Committee report, and is classified. Id, 169. It found that beyond any doubt, the attack was due to innocent error. Id, 180.

From Whence Cristol?

The Ahron in Ahron Jay Cristol is a semitic first name, and Cristol shows up in avotaynu.com, a listing of jewish surnames, although having a surname on the list does not automatically make one jewish. He is a long term bankruptcy judge, and the bankruptcy courts are historically, “as jewish as kosher butchering,” according to a commentator in jewishjournal.com. He has lived most of his 89 years in Miami, the second most jewish metro area the U.S., at 9.8% vs 10.9% in New York, according to jewishvirtuallibrary.com, “Largest Jewish Populated Metropolitan Areas, United States.”

Israeli Ahron Bregman says in a fax to the Liberty Veterans Assoc that in Cristol’s book, “there are omissions and the text itself is sometimes heavily edited. Here is an example (and for the sake of accuracy I am not even quoting from “A History of Israel” but rather straight from the tapes):

Cristol’s version:

13:54LK: What is that? Americans?

Shimon: What Americans?

Kislev: Robert, what did you say? [No one answers.] [This a bracketed comment in Cristol’s transcripts.]

Bregman’s version:

13:53LK: What is it? American?

Shimon: How do you mean, American?

Kislev: Robert, what do you say? [namely: what’s your opinion and clearly a reference to the query just raised regarding the ship’s identity – AB] [The bracketed text is a comment of Bregman.]

Robert: I didn’t say [the tone: I don’t want to know – AB] [The bracketed text is a comment of Bregman.]

Why did Cristol edit the text by saying that “no one answers” where in fact Robert does answer by saying “I didn’t say” in a tone which suggests “1 don’t want to know” or “no comment”?

Another critical moment in the audiotapes comes a bit later:

Cristol’s version:

14:13Menachem: Kislev, what country? [Menachem has become concerned.]

Kislev: Possibly American.

Bregman’s version:

14:14Menachem: Kislev, what state?

Kislev: Probably American

Menachem: What?

Kislev: Probably American.

Why did Cristol shorten this passage?? In order that the word “American” will not ring in our ears for too long? True, this latter passage is far from being a “Smoking gun”, but why to edit such a critical moment in the event??” (end of Bregman fax).

Cristol points to his standing as a “federal judge” as proof of credibility. Bankruptcy referees were not called bankruptcy “judges” until 1973, when Cristol was about 47 years old. Long standing concerns with the bankruptcy courts are addressed in this site, under The courts/stop the plunder in bankruptcy court. The above analogy to “Kosher butchering” might have been unfortunate, but apropo, due to the Talmudic references to gentiles as livestock, and the criticism by eminent experts, of exploitive patterns in those courts.

Gadfly Sherman Skolnick, who brought some judges down but was not always right, claimed that often, bagmen for Israel have waited in the wings, for a cut of bankruptcy court lootings.

Note also, Florida is in the state where USS Liberty Veterans stalwart Ernie Gallo was treated so badly by the heavily jewish Hq of the Navy League.   Look at the claim he “threatened their 501 c 3 status” in light of the recent taking of the 5th amendment by jewish IRS official Lois Lerner, over targeting. Also, the destruction of IRS email servers and backups, paralleling the NSA records abuses in covering up the Liberty incident; the horrible evidence abuses after the JFK and MLK executions; and the immediate destruction of the evidence after 9/11.

 

                       Bringing Ambassador Ball forward

Ball’s prescience– about Israel’s new license to massacre unarmed Americans– was dramatized when Brett Favre did a shout out to the Liberty crew in November, 2018.  If you google USS Liberty and Brett Favre, you will turn up an avalanche of articles by the NY Times, Washington Post, and other dominant publishers.

All of them pushed the lie  that the massacre was inadvertent, and only anti-Semites suggest otherwise. The jewish stranglehold on the media, identified by Pres Nixon and Billy Graham in 1972, has probably gotten worse. The Liberty attack is one of several alarming examples,  of largely false and self serving narratives, forced on the people by these overlords.